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THE WALZ DECISION: MORE ON THE 
RELIGION CLAUSES OF THE 
FIRST AMENDMENT 
Paul G. Kauper* 
IN Walz v. Tax Commissioner of the City of New York
1 the Su-
preme Court, by a seven-to-one vote,2 upheld the constitutional-
ity of the property tax exemption granted under New York law for 
property used exclusively for religious purposes.3 The Walz decision 
is noteworthy not only because it settles a constitutional question 
that has been the subject of much controversy in recent years, but 
also because it sheds further light on the interpretation of the twin 
religion clauses of the first amendment.4 The majority opinion is 
particularly significant since it was written by the new Chief Justice 
and therefore indicates the direction of his thinking in the difficult 
area of church-state relations. Justice Harlan's concurring opinion 
is also of major importance since he took this occasion to voice for 
the first time his commitment to a theory of constitutional inter-
pretation which, if adopted by the Court, would have far-ranging 
consequences in this area of constitutional law. 
The principal thrust of this Article is to determine the contribu-
tion made by the Walz decision to the body of ideas that has been 
developed by the Court in its application of the interdependent free 
exercise and establishment limitations of the first amendment, to 
point up any distinctively new emphases, and to suggest the implica-
tions of these new ideas and emphases for important cases coming 
before the Court at its 1970-1971 term. 
• Henry M. Butzel Professor of Law, University of Michigan. A.B. 1929, Earlham 
College; J.D. 1932, University of Michigan.-Ed. 
1. 397 U.S. 664 (1970). 
2. The case was decided prior to the appointment of Justice Black.mun to the 
vacancy on the Court that resulted from the resignation of Justice Fortas. 
3. In Walz a taxpayer was challenging the validity of the property tax exemption 
as applied to a house of worship. This exemption has its source in the following provi-
sion of the New York Constitution: 
Exemptions from taxation may be granted only by general laws. Exemptions may 
be altered or repealed except those exempting real or personal property used ex-
clusively for religious, educational, or charitable purposes as defined by law and 
owned by any corporation or association organized or conducted exclusively for 
one or more of such purposes and not operating for profit. 
N.Y. CoNsr. art. 16, § 1. As authorized by the constitution, an implementing statute, 
N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAw § 420 para. 1 (McKinney 1965), defines in some detail the 
purposes included in the three categories for which exemptions are required. 
4. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or pro-
hibiting the free exercise thereof •••• " U.S. CoNsr. amend. I. 
[ 179] 
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During the past term, but subsequent to its decision in Walz, the 
Supreme Court announced its decision in Welsh v. United States,15 a 
case involving a claim to exemption from military service on the 
ground of conscientious objection to war. Although the division of 
the Court in Welsh precluded a majority opinion, and although four 
Justices rested their votes on a construction of the statute that avoided 
constitutional issues, the separate opinions by Justice Harlan and by 
Justice White6 deal with the substantial constitutional issues that 
were raised in the case and are therefore highly significant in further 
illuminating the ideas advanced in Walz. Account will be taken of 
these opinions in the appraisal of Walz here undertaken. 
I. PRIOR DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT 
A brief statement of earlier developments in the area of church-
state relations in American constitutional law will serve as a frame 
of reference for appraising the significance of the recent opinions.7 
The cases have made clear that, whatever else is included in the 
proscription of the establishment clause of the first amendment, 
government may not become an active participant in religious affairs 
-either by programs aimed distinctively at the propagation of reli-
gious belief or the cultivation of religious practices, or by intrusion 
of governmental organs into the affairs of religious organizations. 
Thus, the Court has held invalid a system of released time for reli-
gious instruction conducted on public-school premises as part of 
the public-school program,8 a program of prayers and Bible-reading 
in the public schools,9 use of the public-school instruction programs 
to favor a religious view of life,10 and attempts by civil courts to de-
termine doctrinal matters in cases arising out of disputes within 
religious organizations.11 The thrust and import of these cases cannot 
be understood, however, unless they are placed in the perspective 
supplied by other decisions and the doctrinal development stemming 
therefrom. 
5. 398 U.S. 333 (1970). 
6. Justice Harlan concurred in the reversal of conviction (398 U.S. at 344), while 
Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stewart, dissented. 398 U.S. 
at 367. 
7. For a more extended review of these developments, see Kauper, The Warren 
Court: Religious Liberty and Church-State Relations, 67 Mica. L. REv. 269 (1968). 
8. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948). 
9. School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. 
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). See also Murray v. Curlett, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (companion 
case to Schempp). 
10. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968). 
11. Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 
393 U.S. 440 (1969). 
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While the Court's celebrated opinion in Everson v. Board of Edu-
cation12 employed the sweeping no-aid-to-religion language in its 
interpretation of the establishment limitation, the Everson case itself 
and subsequent decisions made clear that governmental programs 
and laws aimed at secular objectives are not rendered invalid merely 
because they result in incidental aid to religion. Thus, the use of 
public funds to reimburse parents for the cost of transporting their 
children to parochial schools, 13 the use of public funds to provide 
textbooks for children in these schools,14 and the use of the police 
power to enact Sunday closing laws15 were all sustained on the secu-
lar-purpose theory. In School District of Abington Township v. 
Schempp,16 the Court refined its secular-purpose doctrine by stating 
the test as follows: "That is to say that to withstand the strictures of 
the Establishment Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose 
and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion."17 
This test was closely identified in Schempp with the concept of neu-
trality as a central canon in the interpretation of the establishment 
clause-an idea already voiced in earlier opinions.18 Yet it did not 
appear that the Court in Schempp was adopting the strict-neutrality 
test implicit in Professor Kurland's thesis that government may not 
use religion as a basis for classification in order either to advance or 
inhibit religion.19 There was no indication that the Court was pre-
pared to overrule Zorach v. Clauson,20 in which it had upheld a state 
system of released time for public-school children allowing them the 
opportunity for religious instruction conducted off the school prem-
ises. Justice Douglas, writing the majority opinion in Zorach, had 
declared that it was appropriate for government to accommodate 
its public-school program to serve the religious interests of the peo-
ple. Accommodation for the purpose of advancing religious interests 
is not, however, compatible with a policy of strict neutrality. More-
over, in Sherbert v. Verner21 the Court held that a state was under a 
12. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
13. Everson v. Board of Educ., !1!10 U.S. l (1947). 
14. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968). 
15. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). 
16. !174 U.S. 203 (1963). 
17. !174 U.S. at 222. 
18. See Justice Black's opinion in Everson, 330 U.S. at 17-18, in which he said that 
if the state elected to be neutral in providing bus transportation to children attending 
public and parochial schools, the Court could not say this was unconstitutional. See 
also Justice Douglas' opinion in Zorach v. Clauson, !143 U.S. 306, 314 (1952), stating that 
government must be neutral on the issue of competition between sects. 
19. P. KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW 18, 112 (1962). 
20. !143 U .5. 306 (1952). 
21. 874 U.S. 398 (1963). The Court here found that South Carolina had violated 
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constitutional duty to grant an exemption on religious grounds from 
a law of general application in order not to interfere with the free 
exercise of religion. Here was a constitutionally required accommo-
dation122 
Thus, .by the time of the Walz decision, secular purpose, neu-
trality, and accommodation had emerged as central concepts in the 
construction of the establishment clause. The government could not 
actively identify itself with religious beliefs or practices. Incidental 
aid to religion and religious bodies was valid if pursuant to a secular 
purpose or if consistent with a policy of neutrality. But, action fa-
voring religious interests was permissible if viewed as an appropri-
ate accommodation to religion, provided the government did not 
thereby become excessively involved in religious matters. Indeed, 
such accommodation was required in some cases to prevent an inter-
ference with the free exercise of religion. 
The development of these doctrinal principles and standards 
raised serious questions for later resolution by the Court. Were there 
any limitations implicit in the establishment limitation on the secu-
lar-purpose doctrine or on the neutrality principle? What was the 
meaning and understanding of neutrality in view of the accommo-
dation doctrine? If neutrality meant that government could not do 
anything to advance or inhibit religion, the accommodation idea 
would have to be scrapped. But if neutrality suggested a judicial 
process whereby the Court attempted to reconcile competing de-
mands of the free exercise and establishment limitations and to steer 
a course which accommodated the establishment clause to underly-
ing values and interests symbolized by the free exercise guarantee, 
the two standards could be reconciled. With these considerations 
and questions in mind, the issues raised by the property tax exemp-
tion for churches and the opinions in the Walz case may be exam-
ined. 
JI. THE PROPERTY TAX EXEMPTION FOR CHURCHES--
BACKGROUND AND ISSUES 
The property tax exemption for property used for religious pur-
poses has had a long unbroken history in this country.23 This exemp-
the free exercise clause in the administration of its unemployment compensation law 
by cutting off unemployment compensation payments to a Seventh Day Adventist who 
had refused a job requiring Saturday work. 
22. See Kauper, Schempp and Sherbert, Studies in Neutrality and Accommodation, 
1963 RELIGION AND THE PUBLIC ORDER 3, 10-23. See also Giannella, Religious Liberty, 
Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development: The Nonestablishment Principle (pt. 2), 
81 HARv. L R.Ev. 513 (1968). 
2~. The range of the exemptions varies considerably among the states. For the 
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tion is recognized by either constitutional or statutory provision in 
the laws of all fifty states and the District of Columbia. These state 
provisions were not open to serious constitutional challenge on fed-
eral grounds until 1947, when the Supreme Court, in the Everson 
decision,24 made the establishment clause applicable to the states by 
way of the fourteenth amendment and formulated the broad no-aid 
doctrine. Even after Everson, however, state courts continued to up-
hold the validity of the property tax ex.emption in the face of the 
establishment clause argument.25 The Supreme Court declined re-
view of these decisions26 until it finally decided to face the question 
in Walz.21 
In view of the variety of ideas advanced and expressions used 
in the Supreme Court's opinions, it was not difficult to advance 
substantial arguments pro and con on the question whether a tax 
exemption for property used for religious purposes violated the 
establishment clause.28 
Relying on the sweeping statement in Everson to the effect that 
government can do nothing which in any way aids any or all reli-
gions, 29 opponents of the ex.emption argued that a tax exemption 
for churches was necessarily invalid since a tax ex.emption affords 
churches some kind of economic aid: for purposes of the Everson 
dictum, it is immaterial whether the economic benefit is in the 
practice in the states, see C. ANTIEAU, P. CARROLL & T. BURKE, RELIGION UNDER THE 
STATE CoNSTITUTIONS 123-69 (1965). See also Van Alstyne, Tax Exemption of Church 
Property, 20 Omo ST. L.J. 461 (1959). 
24. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. l (1947). 
25. Lundberg v. County of Alameda, 46 Cal. 2d 644, 298 P.2d 1, appeal dismissed 
sub nom. Heisey v. County of Alameda, 352 U.S. 921 (1956); General Fin. Corp. 
v. Arcbetto, 93 R.I. 392, 176 A.2d 73 (1961), appeal dismissed, 369 U.S. 423 (1962); Mur• 
ray v. Comptroller of Treasury, 241 Md. 383, 216 A.2d 897, cert. denied, Murray 
v. Goldstein, 385 U.S. 816 (1966). 
26. See the subsequent history of cases cited in note 25 supra. 
27. The New York Court of Appeals had sustained the constitutionality of the 
exemption. Walz v. Tax Commn. of the City of New York, 24 N.Y.2d 80, 246 
N.E.2d 517, 298 N.Y.S.2d 7ll (1969). 
28. For treatment of the subject, see-in addition to the opinions in the state court 
cases cited in note 25 supra-the following: L. PFEFFER, CHuRCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM 
210-19 (rev. ed. 1967); D. ROBERTSON, SHOULD CHuRCHES BE TAXED? (1968); w. TORPEY, 
JUDICIAL DoCTIUNES OF RELIGIOUS RIGHTS IN AMERICA 171-97 (1948); Guild of St. Ives, 
A Report on Churches and Taxation, in THE RELIGIOUS SITUATION 931 (D. Cutler ed. 
1968); Kauper, The Constitutionality of Tax Exemptions for Religious Activities, in 
THE WALL BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE 95 (D. Oaks ed. 1963); Bittker, Churches, Taxes, 
and the Constitution, 78 YALE L.J. 1285 (1969); Giannella, supra note 22 at 544-54; 
Korbel, Do the Federal Income Tax Laws Involve an "Establishment of Religion"?, 
53 A.B.A.J. 1018 (1967); Paulsen, Preferment of Religious Institutions in Tax and 
Labor Legislation, 14 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB. 144 (1949); Comment, Constitutionality 
of Tax Exemptions Accorded American Church Property, 80 ALBANY L. R.Ev. 58 
(1966). 
29. 330 U.S. at 15. 
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form of a direct grant or of an indirect subsidy. Furthermore, ac-
cording to the literal interpretation of the Court's language in Ever-
son, it should make no difference whether or not the exemption 
is part of a broader pattern of exemptions extended to a whole 
category of nonprofit organizations serving purposes that benefit 
the community. Moreover, the usual consideration in favor of tax 
exemptions-that the recipient is rendering a public service that 
frees the government from an obligation of support-would not 
apply t<:> churches since the government cannot engage in religious 
activities. Thus, those persons who objected to the exemption argued 
that it served no valid secular purpose and must be viewed as a govern-
mental action which in its purpose and effect aids religion. Further, 
they argued that the exemption could not be claimed in the name 
of religious liberty since the property tax does not discriminate 
against churches, and is not a tax on the privilege of engaging in 
religious activities, but rather is a quid pro quo exacted for the 
benefits extended by the government to property within its juris-
diction. Finally, those attacking the exemption viewed the historical 
argument in support of the exemption as irrelevant since the rele-
vant constitutional principles were not developed prior to 1947. 
In support of the constitutionality of the property tax exemption, 
the arguments were advanced that, as Everson itself and subsequent 
cases30 demonstrated, the no-aid statement in Everson could not be 
taken literally; that an exemption differed in a substantial way from 
a subsidy;31 that there was no definable correlation between a prop-
erty tax exemption and the benefits of governmental services ex-
tended to all persons;32 that the exemption served a secular purpose 
since churches engage in some public-welfare activities that come 
within the range of public support; that the exemption met the test 
of neutrality since it was usually included in a series of exemptions 
granted to various nonprofit organizations which served the public 
good; that the exemptions were a recognition of the importance and 
usefulness of voluntary organizations in our pluralistic society;33 and, 
by no means least in significance, that the tax exemption either was 
constitutionally required in order to avoid economic burdens and 
governmental involvement in religion proscribed by the free exer-
cise clause or, if not required, was at least constitutionally permis-
30. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 
420 (1961); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952). 
31. See Giannella, supra note 22, at 553. 
32. For a penetrating analysis of the economic aspects of the exemption, sec 
Bittker, supra note 28. 
33. This point is stressed in D. ROBERTSON, supra note 28, at 220-34. 
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sible as an accommodation by the government to values and interests 
served by that clause.34 In addition to these theoretical arguments, 
an unbroken history of property tax exemptions for churches-going 
back to the early days of the nation and authorized by the constitu-
tions or statutes of all fifty states and the District of Columbia-
furnished the basis for a persuasive practical interpretation of the 
establishment clause, founded on a common understanding of proper 
church-state relations in this country. 
The several opinions in Walz may now be examined in the 
context of these arguments and considerations. 
Ill. THE OPINIONS IN WALZ 
The Walz judgment was handed down by an eight-man Court. A 
majority of seven found the exemption constitutional. Chief Justice 
Burger delivered the opinion for the Court, Justices Brennan and 
Harlan wrote separate concurring opinions, and Justice Douglas 
wrote a dissenting opinion. 
Noting at the outset of his compact opinion that it would serve 
no useful purpose to review in detail the background of the estab-
lishment and free exercise clauses of the first amendment or to re-
state what the Court's opinions have reflected over the years, the 
Chief Justice said that "[i]t is sufficient to note that for the men 
who wrote the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment the 'estab-
lishment' of a religion connoted sponsorship, financial support, and 
active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.''35 
After observing that the religion clauses of the first amendment 
are not the most precisely drafted clauses in the Constitution and 
that the Court's opinions, in attempting to articulate the scope of 
the two clauses, have reflected the limitations inherent in formulat-
ing general principles on a case-by-case basis, the Chief Justice said 
that the "considerable internal inconsistency in the opinions of the 
Court derives from what, in retrospect, may have been too sweeping 
utterances on aspects of these clauses that seemed clear in relation 
to the particular cases but have limited meaning as general prin-
ciples.''36 
The Chief Justice noted further that since both the establishment 
and the free exercise clauses are cast in absolute terms, "[t]he Court 
has struggled to find a neutral course between the two Religion 
34. On the latter point, see Kauper, supra note 28, at 102-04, 111-16. 
35. !197 U.S. 664, 668 (1970). 
S6. !197 U.S. at 668. 
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Clauses ... either of which, if expanded to a logical extreme, would 
tend to clash with the other."87 
"The course of constitutional neutrality," the Chief Justice con-
tinued, "cannot be an absolutely straight line; rigidity could well 
defeat the basic purpose of these provisions, which is to ensure that 
no religion be sponsored or favored, none commanded, and none 
inhibited."88 Chief Justice Burger then stated what he thought to be 
the general principle deductible from the first amendment and from 
all that has been said by the Court: "that we will not tolerate 
either governmentally established religion or governmental inter-
ference with religion. Short of those expressly proscribed govern-
mental acts there is room for play in the joints productive of a 
benevolent neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist 
without sponsorship and without interference."89 Having set out 
this general principle, the Chief Justice then proceeded to expand 
upon it: 
Each value judgment under the Religion Clauses must therefore 
turn on whether particular acts in question are intended to establish 
or interfere with religious beliefs and practices or have the effect of 
doing so. Adherence to the policy of neutrality that derives from an 
accommodation of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses has 
prevented the kind of involvement that would tip the balance toward 
government control of churches or governmental restraint on reli-
gious practice.40 
Chief Justice Burger then emphasized the hazard of placing too 
much weight on a few words or phrases of the Court: he chose the 
majority opinion in Everson41 to illustrate his point. Despite the fact 
that Justice Black's opinion in that case contained sweeping language 
to the effect that neither the state nor the federal government could 
aid one or all religions, the actual result in Everson was the uphold-
ing of a form of assistance to the churches that sponsored parochial 
schools-as was true also of the later decision in Board of Education 
v. Allen42 upholding the supplying of textbooks to children in paro-
chial schools through public funds. With respect to Justice Jackson's 
difficulty in reconciling the Everson result with the language of the 
opinion in that case, Burger said that one could sympathize with 
Justice Jackson's logical analysis but agree with the Court's "emi-
37. 397 U.S. at 668-69. 
38. 397 U.S. at 669. 
39. 397 U.S. at 669. 
40. 397 U.S. at 669-70. 
41. Everson v. Board of Educ., !130 U.S. 1 (1947). 
42. 392 U.S. 236 (1968). 
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nently sensible and realistic application of the language of the 
Establishment Clause."43 Significantly, in referring to the Allen 
holding, the Chief Justice said that the Court there heeded both its 
own prior holding in Everson and this country's religious tradition. 
In this same connection, after referring to Justice Douglas' statement 
in Zorach v. Clauson44 that "[w]e are a religious people whose insti-
tutions presuppose a Supreme Being,''45 the Chief Justice underlined 
the following further passage from the Zorach opinion: "When the 
state encourages religious instruction ... it follows the best of our 
traditions."46 
Concluding his discussion of the school cases, Chief Justice Bur-
ger said that "[w]ith all the risks inherent in programs that bring 
about administrative relationships between public education bodies 
and church-sponsored schools, we have been able to chart a course 
that preserved the autonomy and freedom of religious bodies while 
avoiding any semblance of established religion. This is a 'tight rope' 
and one we have successfully traversed."47 
Having stated these general observations, the Chief Justice then 
turned to the particular problem of the property tax exemption: 
The legislative purpose of the property tax exemption is neither 
the advancement nor the inhibition of religion; it is neither spon-
sorship nor hostility. New York, in common with the other States, 
has determined that certain entities that exist in harmonious rela-
tionship to the community at large, and that foster its "moral or 
mental improvement," should not be inhibited in their activities 
by property taxation or the hazard of loss of those properties for 
nonpayment of taxes.4s 
Noting that the property tax exemption for houses of worship was 
included in a broad class of exemptions for property owned by non-
profit quasi-public corporations, Chief Justice Burger continued: 
"The State has an affirmative policy that considers these groups as 
beneficial and stabilizing influences in community life and finds this 
classification useful, desirable, and in the public interest.''49 Then 
the Chief Justice developed the important point that governments 
43. 397 U.S. at 671. Justice Jackson, dissenting in Everson, stated that "the under-
tones of the opinion [of the majority in Everson], advocating complete and uncompro-
mising separation ••• seem utterly discordant with its conclusion •••• " !l!IO U.S. at 19. 
44. !143 U.S. 306 (1952). 
45. Ml! U.S. at 313. 
46. !143 U.S. at 313-14, quoted at 397 U.S. at 672. 
47. !197 U.S. at 672. 
48. 397 U.S. at 672. 
49. 397 U.S. at 673. 
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have not always been tolerant of religious activity, that hostility 
toward religion has taken many shapes and forms, and that grants 
of exemptions historically reflect the concern of authors of constitu-
tions and statutes about the latent dangers inherent in the imposi-
tion of property taxes; he concluded that the "exemption constitutes 
a reasonable and balanced attempt to guard against those dangers."50 
Following up on this idea, yet carefully avoiding any statement 
that the taxation of church property would violate the free exercise 
clause, Chief Justice Burger made the significant point that "[t]he 
limits of permissible state accommodation to religion are by no means 
co-extensive with the noninterference mandated by the Free Exercise 
Clause. To equate the two would be to deny a national heritage 
with roots in the Revolution itself."51 
The Court said that it was unnecessary to justify the tax exemp-
tion for churches on the basis of the social-welfare services or "good 
works" that some churches perform for parishioners and others-
an argument that is often advanced in support of such an exemption. 
The Chief Justice observed in this regard that churches vary sub-
stantially in the scope of such services and that the extent of services 
may vary depending on whether the church serves an urban or 
rural, a rich or poor constituency. To give emphasis to so variable 
an aspect of the work of religious bodies would introduce an element 
of governmental evaluation of the worth of particular social-welfare 
programs, thus producing a kind of continuing day-to-day relation-
ship between church and state which the policy of neutrality seeks 
to minimize. 
But even if the grant of a tax exemption was not aimed at estab-
lishing, sponsoring, or supporting religion, the Chief Justice said, 
the Court had to make the further inquiry whether the end result 
-the effect of the exemption-was "an excessive governmental en-
tanglement with religion."52 The test employed in such an inquiry, 
he noted, inescapably must be one of degree. He noted too that 
the question of governmental entanglement was involved if an 
exemption was granted or if the state simply taxed the churches. 
Thus, the Chief Justice stated, "[e]Iimination of exemption would 
tend to expand the involvement of government by giving rise to 
tax valuation of church property, tax liens, tax foreclosures, and 
the direct confrontations and conflicts that follow in the train of 
those legal processes."53 On the other hand, tax exemptions to 
50. 397 U.S. at 673. 
51. 397 U.S. at 673. 
52. 397 U.S. at 674. 
53. 297 U.S. at 674. 
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churches would give rise to some, although a lesser, involvement 
than would taxing them directly. In analyzing either alternative, 
the questions are whether the involvement is excessive, and whether 
it is a continuing one calling for official and continuing surveillance 
leading to an impermissible degree of entanglement. Obviously a 
direct money subsidy would be a relationship pregnant with involve-
ment and, as with most governmental grant programs, could encom-
pass sustained and detailed administrative relationships for enforce-
ment of statutory or administrative standards, but that is not this 
case. The hazards of churches supporting government are hardly 
less in their potential than the hazards of governments supporting 
churches; each relationship carries some involvement rather than the 
desired insulation and separation.54 
Emphasizing again that the grant of a tax exemption did not 
amount to sponsorship since the government did not transfer part 
of its revenue to churches but simply abstained from demanding that 
the church support the state, the Chief Justice said that "[n]o one 
has ever suggested that tax exemption has converted libraries, art 
galleries, or hospitals into arms of the state or put employees 'on the 
public payroll.' ... [The exemption] restricts the fiscal relationship 
between church and state, and tends to complement and reinforce 
the desired separation insulating each from the other.''55 
Noting that separation of church and state cannot mean absence 
of all contact between the two institutions, Chief Justice Burger said 
the complexities of modem life inevitably produce some contact, 
that the fire and police protection received by houses of religious 
worship are no more than incidental benefits accorded all persons 
or institutions within a state's boundaries-including many other 
exempt organizations-and that the appellant in Walz had not estab-
lished even an arguable quantitative correlation between the pay-
ment of an ad valorem property tax and the receipt of these munici-
pal benefits. 
Finally, the Chief Justice discussed the historical argument, noting 
that "[f]ew concepts are more deeply embedded in the fabric of our 
national life, beginning with pre-Revolutionary colonial times, than 
for the government to exercise at the very least this kind of benev-
olent neutrality toward churches and religious exercise generally 
so long as none was favored over others and none suffered interfer-
ence. "56 In connection with his historical review, the Chief Justice, 
while observing that no one acquires a vested or protected right in 
54. 397 U.S. at 675. 
55. 397 U.S. at 675-76. 
56. ll97 U.S. at 676-77. 
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violation of the Constitution by long use, said: "Yet an unbroken 
practice of according the exemption to churches, openly and by 
affirmative state action, not covertly or by state inaction, is not 
something to be lightly cast aside."57 He bolstered this argument 
by quoting Justice Holmes' weII-known statement, "If a thing has 
been practised for two hundred years by common consent, it will 
need a strong case for the Fourteenth Amendment to affect it ... ",58 
and also by quoting, at an earlier point, Justice Holmes' succinct 
observation that "a page of history is worth a volume of logic."59 
Moreover, Chief Justice Burger observed that nothing in this na-
tional attitude toward religious tolerance and two centuries of 
uninterrupted freedom from taxation has given "the remotest sign 
of leading to an established church or religion and on the contrary 
it has operated affirmatively to help guarantee the free exercise of 
aII forms of religious beliefs."60 
While the Chief Justice closed his opinion with the historical 
argument, Justice Brennan gave it even greater prominence by 
developing it at the beginning of his concurring opinion. He pref-
aced his examination of the historical practice as follows: 
The existence from the beginning of the Nation's life of a prac-
tice, such as tax exemptions for religious organizations, is not conclu-
sive of its constitutionality. But such practice is a fact of considerable 
import in the interpretation of abstract constitutional language. On 
its face, the Establishment Clause is reasonably susceptible of different 
interpretations regarding the exemption. This Court's interpretation 
of the clause, accordingly, is appropriately influenced by the reading 
it has received in the practices of the Nation. . . . The more long-
standing and widely accepted a practice, the greater its impact upon 
constitutional interpretation. History is particularly compelling in 
the present case because of the undeviating acceptance given reli-
gious tax exemption from our earliest days as a Nation. Rarely if 
ever has this Court considered the constitutionality of a practice 
for which the historical support is so overwhelming.61 
Following an extended review of the relevant history, in which he 
placed emphasis on the practices in effect when the Bill of Rights 
was under consideration, and, in which he, like the Chief Justice, 
quoted Justice Holmes' statement that "a strong case" is necessary 
for the fourteenth amendment to affect a practice that has been 
57. 897 U.S. at 678. 
58. Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22, 81 (1922). 
59. New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 849 (1921). 
60. 897 U.S. at 678. 
61. 897 U.S. at 681. 
December 1970] The Walz Decision 191 
followed for two hundred years by common consent, Justice Brennan 
said that an examination both of the governmental purposes for 
granting the exemption and of the type of church-state relationship 
that has resulted from their existence makes clear that no such 
"strong case" exists. In his review of the historical materials, Justice 
Brennan pointed out that at the time of the adoption of the first 
amendment neither Jefferson nor Madison expressed opinions that 
tax exemptions for churches were invalid as an establishment of 
religion-although Madison, in an essay written much later, did 
make this argument in conjunction with other arguments which, 
according to Justice Brennan, represent "an extreme view of church-
state relations."62 
In the substantive part of his opinion, Justice Brennan concurred 
in the decision of the Court on the basis of the test he had formu-
lated in his concurring opinion in the Schempp case, in which he 
said that what the establishment clause forbids are those involve-
ments of religious with secular institutions which (1) serve the 
essentially religious activities of religious institutions; or (2) em-
ploy the organs of government for essentially religious purposes; or 
(3) use essentially religious means to serve governmental ends, when 
secular means would suffice.63 Justice Brennan's test turns on the dis-
tinction between the religious and the secular. In his view, govern-
ment has two basic secular purposes for granting real-property tax 
exemptions to religious organizations. First, these organizations, like 
other private, nonprofit organizations, contribute to the well-being 
of the community in a variety of nonreligious ways, and thereby 
perform tasks that would otherwise have to be paid for by general 
taxation or else left undone. Second, government grants exemptions 
to religious organizations "because they uniquely contribute to the 
pluralism of American society by their religious activities. Govern-
ment may properly include religious institutions among the variety 
of private, non-profit groups which receive tax exemptions, for each 
group contributes to a vigorous, pluralistic society."64 
Justice Brennan then turned to the question whether a granting 
of the exemption results in extensive state involvement in religion. 
While emphasizing that general subsidies of religious activities would 
"of course" constitute state involvement with religion, he found tax 
exemptions and general subsidies to be qualitatively different. A sub-
sidy involves a direct transfer of public moneys through the subsi-
62. 397 U.S. at 684-85 n.5. 
63. School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 294-95 (1963) 
CTustice Brennan, concurring), quoted at 397 U.S. at 680-81. 
64. 397 U.S. at 689. 
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dized enterprise and uses resources exacted from taxpayers as a 
whole, whereas an exemption assists the exempted enterprise only 
passively by relieving a privately funded venture of the burden of 
paying taxes.65 Tax exemptions, accordingly, constitute mere passive 
state involvement with religion and not the active involvement 
characteristic of outright governmental subsidy. Indeed, as pointed 
out in the majority opinion, the termination of the exemption would 
itself lead to involvement and would have a significant fiscal impact 
on religious organizations. At this point in his argument Justice 
Brennan dropped a footnote containing the interesting observation 
that the state involvement with religion that would be occasioned 
by any cessation of exemptions might conflict with the demands of 
the free exercise clause. 66 However, he stated that it was unnecessary 
to reach any question of free exercise in the present case, concluding 
that "while I believe that 'hostility, not neutrality, would characterize 
the refusal to provide [the exemptions] ... , I do not say the govern-
ment must provide [them] or that the Court should intercede if it 
fails to do so.' "67 
Having established these premises, Justice Brennan had no 
trouble fitting the exemptions into the three-pronged test set forth 
in his Schempp opinion-the exemptions do not serve the essentially 
religious activities of religious institutions, or employ the organs of 
government for essentially religious purposes, or use essentially reli-
gious means to serve governmental ends when secular means would 
suffice. His observations on the third point are particularly inter-
esting: 
The means churches use to carry on their public services activities 
are not 'essentially religious' in nature. They are the same means 
used by any purely secular organization-money, human time and 
skills, physical facilities. It is true that each church contributes to 
the pluralism of our society through its purely religious activities, 
but the state encourages these activities not because it champions 
religion per se but because it values religion among a variety of 
private, nonprofit enterprises that contribute to the diversity of the 
65. Respecting this distinction, Justice Brennan quoted Professor Giannella's state• 
ment that "[i]n the case of direct subsidy, the state forcibly diverts the income of both 
believers and non-believers to churches," while "[i]n the case of an exemption, the 
state merely refrains from diverting to its own uses income independently generated 
by the churches through voluntary contributions." See Giannella, Religious Liberty, 
Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development: The Nonestablishment Principle (pt. 
2), 81 HARV. L. REv. 513, 553 (1968). Also on this point see Guild of St. Ives, A Report 
on Churches and Taxation, in THE RELIGIOUS SITUATION 931 (D. Cutler ed. 1968). 
66. 397 U.S. at 692 n.12. 
67. 397 U.S. at 692 n.12. The quotation is from Justice Brennan's concurring opin-
ion in School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 299 (1963). 
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Nation. Viewed in this light, there is no nonreligious substitute for 
religion as an element of our societal mosaic, just as there is no non-
literary substitute for literary groups.68 
In a separate opinion, Justice Harlan said that, while he entirely 
subscribed to the result reached by the majority and found himself 
in basic agreement with what the Chief Justice had written, he 
thought it appropriate-in view of the radiations of the issues 
involved-to state those considerations that for him were controlling 
in the case. He said that "[w]hat is at stake as a matter of policy 
is preventing that kind and degree of government involvement in 
religious life that, as history teaches us, is apt to lead to strife and 
frequently strain a political system to the breaking point."69 Noting 
that two requirements frequently articulated and applied in the 
cases for achieving this goal are "neutrality" and "voluntarism," 
Justice Harlan said that these two related and mutually reinforcing 
concepts "are short-form for saying that the Government must nei-
ther legislate to accord benefits that favor religion over nonreligion, 
nor sponsor a particular sect, nor try to encourage participation in 
or abnegation of religion .... Neutrality and voluntarism stand as 
barriers against the most egregious and hence divisive kinds of state 
involvement in religious matters."70 Justice Harlan stated further, 
however, that an adherence to these concepts-although they are at 
the core of the religious clauses-may not suffice by itself to achieve 
in all cases the purpose of the first amendment-to prevent undue 
government involvement in religious life. Justice Harlan noted that, 
in addition, there still is the question whether 
governmental involvement, while neutral, may be so direct or in 
such degree as to engender a risk of politicizing religion .... 
[H]istory cautions that political fragmentation on sectarian lines 
must be guarded against. Although the very fact of neutrality may 
limit the intensity of involvement, government participation in cer-
tain programs, whose very nature is apt to entangle the state in 
details of administration and planning, may escalate to the point 
of inviting undue fragmentation.71 
Turning then to the tax exemption itself, Justice Harlan stated 
that this legislation neither encouraged nor discouraged participation 
in religious life and thus satisfied the voluntarism requirement of the 
68. ll97 U.S. at 69ll. 
69. ll97 U.S. at 694. 
70. ll97 U.S. at 694-95. 
71. ll97 U.S. at 695. In making this argument, Justice Harlan referred to a recent 
article by Professor Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1680 
(1969). 
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first amendment. In his opinion, the statute also satisfied the re-
quirement of neutrality, the application of which, he felt, requires 
an equal protection mode of analysis. It was the Court's obligation 
"to survey meticulously the circumstances of governmental categories 
to eliminate, as it were, religious gerrymanders."72 In Harlan's view, 
the critical question in any particular case was "whether the circum-
ference of legislation encircles a class so broad that it can be fairly 
concluded that religious institutions could be thought to fall within 
the natural perimeter."73 The New York exemption for religious 
organizations fell within a class of exemptions for organizations 
whose common denominator is their nonprofit pursuit of activities 
devoted to culture and moral improvement and the doing of "good 
works" by performing certain social services in the community that 
might otherwise have to be assumed by government. Justice Harlan 
said that, to the extent that religious institutions sponsor secular 
activities that the legislation was designed to promote, it was con-
sistent with a theory of neutrality to grant these institutions an 
exemption, just as government grants such an exemption to other 
organizations devoting resources to these secular projects. Further-
more, under Justice Harlan's theory, churches may properly receive 
an exemption even though they do not sponsor the secular-type 
activities but exist merely for the convenience of their interested 
members: "As long as the breadth of exemption includes groups 
that pursue cultural, moral, or spiritual improvement in multifar-
ious secular ways, including, I would suppose, groups whose avowed 
tenets may be antitheological, atheistic, or agnostic, I can see no lack 
of neutrality in extending the benefit of the exemption to organized 
religious groups."74 
Justice Harlan then discussed the distinctions between subsidies 
and exemptions. Although exemptions do not differ from subsidies 
as an economic matter, there are, he noted, significant differences 
between the two. Subsidies, unlike exemptions, must be passed on 
periodically; they thus invite more political controversy than do 
exemptions and, as a general rule, are granted on the basis of 
more complicated, specifically enumerated qualifications. As a conse-
quence, subsidies frequently involve state administration to a greater 
degree than do exemptions. Justice Harlan then noted that whether 
subsidies or direct aid entail that degree of involvement that is pro-
hibited by the Constitution is a question that must be reserved for a 
72. 397 U.S. at 696. 
73. 397 U.S. at 696. 
74. 397 U.S. at 697. 
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later case upon a record that fully develops all the pertinent consid-
erations-such as the significance and character of subsidies in our 
political system and the role of the government administration in re-
lation to the particular program aided.75 Justice Harlan concluded 
with the interesting point that the states, while bound to observe 
strict neutrality, should be freer to experiment with involvement in 
religious affairs than should the federal government; this point is in 
accordance with his frequently expressed rejection of the idea that 
the effect of the fourteenth amendment is to make the first amend-
ment applicable to the states.76 
The central point of Justice Douglas' dissenting opinion is that 
there is no difference between exemptions and subsidies in terms 
of what he regards as the support of religion which is forbidden by 
the establishment clause. Even prior to Walz, Justice Douglas had 
indicated a retraction of his support for the Everson decision.77 In 
any event, Justice Douglas did not feel that Everson was controlling 
since there the public funds were used to support a secular purpose, 
whereas through the tax exemption here the state was supporting 
a house of worship. Moreover, in Justice Douglas' view the exemp-
tion challenged in Walz favored believers over nonbelievers-a re-
sult forbidden by the first amendment. While recognizing that an 
exemption for nonsectarian welfare activities conducted by churches 
would be permissible, he would require a clear separation of this 
function from the churches' other activities in order to warrant an 
exemption for the agency engaged in such activities. 
Justice Douglas stated that the reliance on the historical argu-
ment by the majority was misplaced since the constitutional ques-
tions were not acutely raised until 1947 when the Court first made 
the first amendment's establishment clause applicable to the states 
in Everson. He did not, however, attempt to refute the argument 
made by both the Chief Justice and by Justice Brennan that a long 
unbroken history sheds some persuasive light on the common under-
standing respecting church-state relations, nor did he take account 
of the long history of tax exemptions for church property in the 
District of Columbia which is under the jurisdiction of Congress 
75. Justice Harlan added a footnote that "[t]he dimension of the problem would 
also require consideration of what kind of pluralistic society is compatible with the 
political concepts and traditions embodied in our Constitution." 397 U.S. at 699 n.2. 
76. Justice Harlan has advanced this point consistently in distinguishing between 
the limitations imposed by the first amendment on Congress and by the due process 
clause of the fourteenth amendment with respect to the enactment of obscenity legisla-
tion. See his separate opinion in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 376, 496 (1957). 
77. See Justice Douglas' separate opinion in Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 443-44 
(1962). 
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and directly controlled by the first amendment. In the final analysis, 
Justice Douglas' position appears to be that the historical practices, 
common understanding, and precedent antedating the Everson deci-
sion should play no significant part in the judicial interpretation of 
the establishment clause. 
IV. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF WALZ 
The Walz decision seems clearly to settle the question whether 
government may grant an exemption from property taxes for prop-
erty distinctively used for religious purposes. The property involved 
in Walz was used for a house of worship. The case has no direct 
bearing on the validity of tax exemptions granted to religious or-
ganizations for property used for income-producing purposes. It 
should be noted that in Justice Harlan's view the exemption for 
property used for religious purpose is valid only if it is a part of 
a general scheme of exemption of property of all nonprofit organi-
zations which in some way serve the interests of their members or 
promote the common good. It seems clear, however, that the basic 
rationale of the majority opinion supports a tax exemption for 
churches apart from whether that exemption is included in a 
broader characterization. The majority's rationale turns on the 
concept of "benevolent neutrality," which is discussed more fully 
below.78 
On the larger question of what Walz contributes to the inter-
pretation of the religion clauses of the first amendment, attention 
can be concentrated on the opinion for the Court by Chief Justice 
Burger, with collateral references to the other opinions at appro-
priate points. 
First, the historical argument, based on the theory that a long 
established practice has persuasive practical value as an aid to con-
struction of the establishment clause, receives strong support from 
the majority opinion. In light of the fact that Madison is often 
thought of as the architect of the first amendment and that, conse-
quently, his views are frequently relied on, Justice Brennan's footnote 
observation that some of the opinions expressed by Madison in 
later life represent "extreme views" on the establishment clause 
is particularly significant.70 
Second, the court eschews absolute and rhetorical extremes but 
speaks instead of "realistic and sensible solutions" to the questions 
posed in the interpretation of the religion clauses of the first amend-
78. See notes S!l-95 infra and accompanying text. 
79. See note 62 supra and accompanying text. 
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ment: complete separation is not possible. The Chief Justice's opin-
ion as well as the opinions by Justices Harlan and Brennan deal 
further blows to the broad no-aid limitation which is so frequently 
extracted from Everson as a controlling principle. Moreover, as the 
Chief Justice says, the whole problem of interpretation cannot be 
approached in terms of absolutes-both because absolute separation 
is not possible and because of the necessity of reconciling and ac-
commodating two competing clauses that are cast in absolute terms. 
Third, the Chief Justice says that for those who wrote the reli-
gion clauses of the first amendment the "establishment" of a 
religion connoted "sponsorship, financial support, and active in-
volvement of the sovereign in religious activity."80 Viewed as a 
definition, this language states a more restrictive view of establish-
ment than appears in some of the Court's earlier utterances and is 
more in accord with the historical meaning of the term.81 Of equal 
importance with this succinct statement of the meaning of estab-
lishment is the emphasis by the Chief Justice on the general pur-
pose of the twin religion clauses of the first amendment-to promote 
and protect religious liberty.82 The impact on religion of govern-
mental acts and programs assumes a central place in his opinion. 
The Chief Justice sees the problem of interpretation as one of rec-
onciling the establishment and free exercise clauses and of accom-
modating the one to the other. From this view of the problem 
follows the important point that, between the governmental acts 
that amount to an establishment and those that interfere with free 
exercise, there may be laws or programs that fall within the category 
of what he describes as "benevolent neutrality"-an area in which 
the government may act in order both to recognize the interests 
served by the free exercise clause and to avoid hostility to religion. 
Fourth, the Walz opinions contribute substantially to the devel-
opment of the concept of neutrality. Neutrality plays a large part 
in the Chief Justice's opinion; but his is the neutrality of accom-
modation and a neutrality which, by according a central place to 
religious liberty, permits a preferential treatment for religion. Hence, 
it is a "benevolent neutrality." Again it should be emphasized that 
the majority opinion does not rest its case on the ground that the 
80. 397 U.S. at 668. 
81. Significantly, the Chief Justice supports this statement by reference to "establish-
ment" in England, the colonies, and European countries. 397 U.S. at 668. 
82. For development of the idea that religious freedom is the central concern of 
the first amendment and tha:: the principle of church-state separation is defensible 
only as long as it promotes religious freedom, see Katz, The Case for Religious Liberty, 
in RELIGION IN .AMERICA 95 CT. Cogley ed. 1958). 
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churches could claim the exemption in the name of religious liberty 
as a matter of constitutional right. But, short of that, the legislature 
may act in order to avoid hostility and to protect against potential 
burdens on churches which could retard the free exercise of reli-
gion. The point made by the Chief Justice-that the power of gov-
ernment to accommodate religion by relieving religious activities 
of burdens otherwise imposed by law is not commensurate with the 
demands of the free exercise clause-is central to his position since 
it defines what he means by benevolent neutrality. According to 
Burger, benevolent neutrality is a neutrality which, far from re-
quiring that religion be a neutral factor in governmental programs, 
permits a deliberate favoring of religion in order to free religion 
from possible intrusions by and entanglements with governmental 
authority. Thus, in the middle ground between what is prohibited 
by the establishment clause and what is required in the name of 
free exercise are the governmental acts that are permitted in order to 
favor the policy of free exercise. 
This position of benevolent neutrality, resting on a theory of 
reconciling the opposing demands of the free exercise and the estab-
lishment limitations, and permitting a legislative choice that favors 
free exercise, stands in contrast to the position of strict neutrality 
that Justice Harlan stresses in his opinion. Because of this differ-
ence, Harlan grounds his concurrence on the idea that the churches 
are simply given the same exemption extended to other types of 
nonprofit organizations. Strict neutrality does not require the state 
to discriminate against churches. It is evident that, with this case, 
Justice Harlan has now adopted Professor Kurland's thesis that 
religion may not be used as a basis for classification in order to favor 
or inhibit religion.83 It cannot be emphasized too strongly that 
Justice Harlan's concept of neutrality is conspicuously different from 
the Chief Justice's concept of benevolent neutrality. The latter does 
not rest upon a classification interpretation of the first amendment 
in any sense, but uses the term "neutrality" to describe the judicial 
function in seeking a balance between the free exercise and estab-
lishment limitations.84 Justice Harlan's neutrality rests on the basis 
that the first amendment already has struck a balance by eliminating 
religion as a classification factor. 
83. See note 19 supra and accompanying text. 
84. This concept of neutrality was stressed by Professor Katz in his article, Freedom 
of Religion and State Neutrality, 20 U. CHI. L. R.Ev. 426 (1953). The thrust of his 
position was that the establishment limitation, like the free exercise clause, was aimed 
at religious liberty, and that government was not neutral if the establishment limita• 
tion was interpreted to require a discrimination on religious grounds in the disburse• 
ment of public benefits or otherwise to impede the free exercise of religion. 
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The importance of the difference between benevolent neutrality 
and strict neutrality is brought out more fully in the separate 
opinions by Justice White and Justice Harlan in Welsh v. United 
States.sr. Justice White, in his dissenting opinion joined by Chief 
Justice Burger and Justice Stewart, agrees with Justice Harlan that 
Congress intended to exempt from military service only persons who 
object on distinctively religious grounds, and then goes on to find 
that Congress, in exercising its power to enact military service laws, 
could appropriately limit the exemptions in this way. In his opinion, 
Justice White says that such action is not prohibited by the establish-
ment clause since Congress, even if the exemption is not constitu-
tionally required by the free exercise clause, could appropriately 
choose to steer clear of free exercise problems by granting this ex-
emption. In his words, "It is very likely that [the statute's exemp-
tion] is a recognition by Congress of free exercise values and its view 
of desirable or required policy in implementing the Free Exercise 
Clause."86 That judgment, according to Justice White, is entitled to 
respect by the Court. Thus, Justice White's opinion gives further ex-
pression to the point made in Chief Justice Burger's opinion in Walz 
that the limit of accommodation is not defined by the requirements 
of free exercise. On the other hand, Justice Harlan in his concurring 
opinion, more fully explicates in Welsh the position he adopted in 
Walz and is now firmly committed to the view that any classification 
that gives religion a preferred position is in itself a violation of the 
establishment clause. Professor Kurland has won at least one convert 
on the Court. 
As pointed out at the beginning of this Article,87 the accommoda-
tion theory propounded by the Chief Justice in Walz is not new. 
It has its foundation in the Zorach opinion,88 from which the Chief 
Justice quotes in an approving way. Moreover, Sherbert was an 
extraordinary instance of constitutionally required preference on 
religious grounds.89 Walz is important because it affirms the accom-
modation theory in a striking way, notwithstanding what has been 
said in intervening opinions about neutrality and secular purpose. 
What emerges as distinctively new in Walz is the clear-cut adoption 
85. 398 U.S. 333, 344, 367 (1970) Uustice Harlan, concurring; Justice White, dissent-
ing). For the purpose of this Article, discussion of Welsh will be confined to the 
opinions dealing with the question whether Congress may give a preferred position in 
the selective service laws to those persons who entertain objection on distinctively 
religious grounds. 
86. 398 U.S. at 371. 
87. See text accompanying notes 20-22 supra. 
88. See note 20 supra and accompanying text• 
89. See note 21 supra. 
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by Justice Harlan of the strict neutrality approach proposed by 
Professor Kurland.90 Adoption of this view requires, as Justice 
Harlan acknowledges in his Welsh opinion, a rejection of both 
Zorach and Sherbert91 and a modification of his own views as ex.-
pressed in his Sherbert dissent.92 In addition, by adopting the strict-
neutrality approach Justice Harlan leaves himself in a position 
where he can find a tax exemption for religious purposes valid only 
if it is included in a broader classification which has the effect of 
neutralizing religion as a discrete ground for favored classification.93 
A result of both Walz and Welsh is to sharpen the controversy 
over the question whether or not government is required to follow 
a strictly neutral policy respecting religious matters. According to 
the Burger-White thesis, the Congress or state legislatures-in en-
acting statutes within their areas of legislative concern-may exer-
cise their normal power to classify by exempting religious activities 
in order to avoid possible burdens on the free exercise of religion. 
Justice Harlan attacks this theory on the ground that it is for the 
Court, not the Congress, to determine the meaning of the free exer-
cise clause. If Justice Harlan has his way, no free exercise violation 
can be demonstrated unless the effect of a law is to discriminate on 
religious grounds. Conversely, in Justice Harlan's view legislation 
that does not grant preferential treatment on religious grounds is 
not invalid on establishment grounds simply because it benefits 
religious activities. In attacking the Burger-White benevolent-neu-
trality concept and advocating the Kurland strict-neutrality thesis, 
Justice Harlan faces formidable obstacles.04 Zorach and Sherbert, 
as previously observed, are solid precedents to support the Burger-
White thesis. History generally is on the side of Justices Burger and 
White-various federal and state statutes authorize exemptions on 
religious grounds and thereby give preferential treatment. As noted 
by Justice White in his Welsh opinion, perhaps the most compelling 
consideration is that the first amendment itself classifies on religious 
grounds.05 
Fifth, it is clear that the majority opinion in Walz does not 
turn on the secular-purpose test as it was stated in the Schempp 
90. See note 19 supra and accompanying text. 
91. 398 U.S. at 360-61. 
92. 398 U.S. at 358 n.9. 
93. On the question how broad the classification must be to satisfy Justice Harlan's 
requirement of a religiously neutral classification, see 397 U.S. at 697 n.l. 
94. For a discussion of Professor Kurland's thesis, see Kauper, Book Review, 41 TEXAS 
L. RJ;:v. 467 (1963); Konvitz, The Constitution or Neutral Principles, in 1963 R.Euc10N 
AND THE PUBUC ORDER 99. 
95. 398 U.S. at 372. 
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case.96 Indeed, Schempp and the test stated there are not expressly 
mentioned in the majority opinion. Moreover, the Chief Justice em-
phasizes that the Court does not rest its opinion on the theory that 
churches perform some secular functions that the government may 
appropriately recognize. This is understandable, for, depending on its 
interpretation and application, the Schempp test can be equated with 
a concept of neutrality that is incompatible with the concepts of ac-
commodation and benevolent neutrality emphasized in the Court's 
opinion. But it is important to remember that a majority of the Court 
in Walz was content to deal with the case as one raising the question 
of a preferred position for religion; on that basis, a discussion of 
secular purpose was not required. This does not mean that the 
majority of the Court has abandoned the secular-purpose test or 
its use in the case where legislation is designed to put religious in-
stitutions on an equal footing rather than to give them a preferential 
position. Indeed, the Court's reference with obvious approval to the 
Everson and Allen decisions indicates that the secular-purpose test 
will continue to have vitality in cases involving nonpreferential 
governmental support of programs carried on by church-related 
agencies. 
Finally, the new doctrinal element found in Walz is the em-
phasis on what the Court's opinion describes as "entanglements" 
between church and state and the corresponding necessity of closely 
examining governmental programs to see if the government thereby 
becomes excessively entangled in the affairs of the churches. But 
while the entanglements terminology is new, the substance of the 
idea as an important consideration in the interpretation of the 
establishment clause is not. Underlying the twin religion clauses of 
the first amendment is the idea that the state and the churches have 
separate functions to perform and that the state may neither in-
trude into the affairs of the churches nor actively intervene in reli-
gious matters.97 The Chief Justice described the specific problem in 
Walz in terms of "entanglements." Neither Justice Brennan nor Jus-
tice Harlan used the "entanglements" terminology. Although address-
ing themselves to the same question as the Chief Justice, they spoke 
in terms of "involvement"-whether the state by granting a tax ex-
emption to churches thereby unduly involves itself in the affairs of 
the churches. Applying these standards to the facts in Walz, the 
96. See text accompanying notes 16-17 supra. 
97. This idea found its most recent expression in Presbyterian Church v. Mary 
Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969), in which the 
Court held that a state court, in determining an issue respecting use of church property, 
could not inquire into doctrinal matters as a basis for decision. 
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Chief Justice found that the tax exemption produced a minimum 
of entanglements between church and state, while Justices Brennan 
and Harlan reached the same conclusion in terms of involvement. 
They agreed too that a policy of taxing church property would create 
greater risks of entanglement or involvement. 
The difference between the "entanglements" terminology of 
the Chief Justice and the "involvement" language of Justices Bren-
nan and Harlan is probably nothing more than a difference in choice 
of words to handle the specific problem before the Court. For the 
Chief Justice, entanglements are one aspect of involvement and 
have special reference to day-to-day administrative relations between 
church and state which result in governmental encroachment upon 
the autonomy of the churches. Moreover, he used the term involve-
ment in a broader sense in his definition of establishment as "spon-
sorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in 
religious activity.''98 Such involvement is invalid even without any 
resulting entanglements between church and state. On the other 
hand, Justices Brennan and Harlan used the term "involvement" 
both to refer to what, in a comprehensive sense, the Chief Justice 
characterized as "entanglements" and to describe state action that 
gives support to religious beliefs or practices. "Involvement" in this 
latter sense played a large part in the opinions in the Schempp case.00 
The Walz opinions now suggest a two-step approach to the ques-
tions that bring the establishment clause into play. The first or 
threshold question is whether the challenged governmental action 
must be characterized as a forbidden establishment of religion in 
the sense that the government is actively supporting religion or is 
deeply involved in it; or whether, conversely, the action can be justi-
fied on the grounds that it achieves a secular purpose, or is consistent 
with strict neutrality, or is either required or permitted as an ac-
commodation to religious liberty. 
But even if the governmental action can be upheld on the basis 
of one or more of the tests employed in answering the threshold 
question, the second step requires the Court to examine whether the 
action results in extensive entanglements or involvement by the state 
in the affairs of the churches. In short, a concept of church-state rela-
tions, usually described in the language of the separation principle, 
serves as a further limitation on governmental action in dealing with 
religious organizations. 
It is this second step that may raise the most critical questions 
98. 397 U.S. at 668. 
99. See Kauper, Schempp and Sherbert, Studies in Neutrality and Accommodation, 
1963 R.l!.LIGION AND THE PUBLIC ORDER 3, 
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in further cases coming before the Court, particularly when affirma-
tive payments by way of grants, subsidies, or purchases of service are 
involved. The opinions in Walz all suggest important differences on 
the entanglements or involvement issue between the passive aid 
afforded by tax exemption and the positive aid furnished by pay-
ments of various kinds. Cases involving the validity of governmental 
financial assistance to church-related institutions will come before 
the Court during its 1970-1971 term. The implications for these 
cases of the doctrinal development to date, including the ideas ex-
pressed in the several opinions in Walz, may be briefly noted. 
V. GOVERNMENTAL AssISTANCE TO CHURCH-RELATED 
EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 
The Supreme Court has noted probable jurisdiction in two cases 
dealing with the validity of financial assistance to church-related edu-
cational institutions. Tilton v. Finch100 raises the issue whether the 
federal government, pursuant to a general program for assistance in 
the financing of capital facilities at both public and private colleges 
and universities,101 may make capital grants to church-related colleges 
for specified academic facilities. In Lemon v. Kurzman,102 the central 
question is whether a state program for purchasing secular teaching 
services at parochial schools as part of a general program for as-
sistance to private schools at the elementary and secondary level is 
consistent with the establishment limitation. 
A look at the disposition of these cases at the lower court level is 
instructive on the standards used in dealing with the question of 
government aid to church-related institutions. Three-judge federal 
district courts were convened in both cases. In both the Tilton103 and 
Lemon104 cases, the courts sustained the validity of the programs 
involved by use of the Schempp test. Respecting both the capital 
grants to church-related colleges and the purchase of secular services 
in parochial schools, the courts found a secular legislative purpose 
and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion. 
These cases were decided and the opinions written before the Court 
handed down its judgment and opinion in Walz. Subsequent to 
Walz, a three-judge federal district court in DiCenso v. Robinson105 
100 . .312 F. Supp. 1191 (D. Conn.), prob. juris. noted, .399 U.S. 904 (1970) (No. 1555, 
1969 Term; renumbered No. 15.3, 1970 Term). 
IOI. Title I of the Higher Education Facilities Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 701-21 (1964). 
102. !110 F. Supp . .35 (E.D. Pa. 1969) prob. juris. noted, .397 U.S. 10.34 (1970) (No. 
1189, 1969 Term; renumbered No. 89, 1970 Term). 
10.3 . .312 F. Supp. 1191 (D. Conn. 1970). The court's decision was unanimous. 
104. 810 F. Supp . .35 (E.D. Pa. 1969). Judge Hastie dissented . .310 F. Supp. at 49. 
105. 816 F. Supp. 112 (D.R.!.) prob. juris. noted, 89 U.S.L.W • .3199 (U.S. Nov. 9, 
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held that the Rhode Island statute that authorized the purchase 
of secular teaching services106-and which was basically similar to 
the Pennsylvania statute held valid in the Lemon case107-was un-
constitutional in its application to parochial schools, on the grounds: 
(I) that, because of the nature and purpose of parochial schools, any 
payment for secular services amounts to support of a religious enter-
prise, and (2) that the administration of the program created re-
lationships resulting in the excessive entanglements of which the 
Chief Justice spoke in Walz.108 The court in DiCenso found the 
Schempp test unworkable, and, in any event, felt that it had been 
abandoned or substantially modified by the new doctrinal emphasis 
in Walz. The DiCenso decision is chiefly important, however, for its 
reliance on the entanglements limitation derived from Walz.100 
The Supreme Court in its review of Tilton and Lemon will have 
to come to grips in a critical way with the several standards de· 
veloped in the church-state cases decided up to this point. The 
use of the Schempp test to validate spending in aid of secular pur-
poses at church-related educational institutions is well supported by 
the Everson and Allen decisions, both of which were cited with ap-
proval in Walz.110 Admittedly, the "primary effect" part of the 
Schempp test is, as pointed out by the majority in DiCenso, am-
biguous;111 but nothing in Walz suggests that Schempp is no longer 
1970) (No. 570). shortly before this Article went to press the Supreme Court agreed 
to review this decision and has set the case for argument immediately following the 
argument in Lemon and Tilton. 39 U.S.L.W. 3199 (U.S. Nov. 9, 1970). 
106. Salary Supplement to Nonpublic Schoolteachers Act, R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 16·51-1 
to -9 (Supp. 1969). 
107. Nonpublic Elementary &: Secondary Education Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, 
§§ 5601-09 (Supp. 1969). 
108. Judge Pettine of the three-judge court dissented from the first ground of the 
court's holding but joined in the holding on the second ground. 316 F. Supp. at 
123-24. 
109. Still more recently a federal three-judge court has held invalid the Connecticut 
statute authorizing the use of public funds to purchase the teaching of secular subjects 
at private schools. Johnson v. Sanders, 39 U.S.L.W. 2225 (D. C. Conn. Oct. 15, 1970). 
The Michigan supreme court, on the other hand, in a post-Walz advisory opinion, 
with two justices dissenting, has sustained the validity of comparable Michigan legis-
lation under both the Federal and the Michigan Constitutions. In re Legislature's 
Request for Opinion on Constitutionality of Chapter 2 of Amendatory Act No. 100 of 
the Public Acts of 1970, 39 U.S.L.W. 2224 (Mich. Sup. Ct. Oct. 5, 1970). 
110. For an ex.tended development of the secular-purpose argument to support 
public assistance to parochial schools, see Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid 
to Parochial Schools, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 260 (1968). 
lll. 316 F. Supp. at 119. According to the Schempp test, "there must be a secular 
legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion." 
374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963) (emphasis added). The phrase "a primary effect" is open to 
several interpretations when more than one primary effect may be attributed to a 
program. Is it enoug~ to sustain a program that it has one primary effect that neither 
advances nor inhibits religion? Or, contrariwise, is a program unconstitutional if one 
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relevant or that it cannot be extended, as was done by the lower 
courts, to validate the programs involved in Tilton and Lemon. 
If strict neutrality, as urged by Justice Harlan, is the key to in-
terpretation of the twin religion clauses of the first amendment, a 
strong case may be made to support the results reached by the lower 
courts in Tilton and Lemon. The federal government, in providing 
capital grants to meet educational needs at all institutions of higher 
learning, including church-related colleges, is pursing a policy which 
neutralizes the religious factor. Similarly, a state follows a religiously 
neutral policy when it supports all elementary and secondary schools, 
including parochial schools. Indeed, if neutrality is the criterion, a 
discrimination against parochial schools is constitutionally imper-
missible. 
Although neither Tilton nor Lemon involves the problem of 
preferential treatment, the accommodation concept is not irrelevant 
to the issues they raise. Recalling the theme emphasized by Justice 
Brennan in his concurring opinion in Walz,112 some degree of sup-
port of private educational institutions may be viewed as a recogni-
tion both of the importance of voluntaristic institutions in our 
pluralistic society and of the social loss that would result if these 
institutions decline in quality or cease to exist because of financial 
burdens. A further consideration enters into the picture with respect 
to the parochial-school problem. Parents are compelled by law to 
send their children to school, but the Constitution assures that 
parents will have freedom to choose to send their children to private 
schools.113 Nothing in the Supreme Court's decisions dealing with 
private schools suggests that the parental freedom to send children 
to a private school implies a constitutional duty on the part of the 
state to give financial support to these schools.114 Certainly a limita-
primary effect advances or inhibits religion? Or in a case of mixed effects, must a 
court choose which is the dominant one? 
112. See text accompanying note 64 supra. 
113. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925). 
114. In Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), the Court held that a state could 
not deny unemployment compensation benefits to a Seventh Day Adventist who re-
fused a job that required her to work on Saturday contrary to her religious convic• 
tions. The Court made the argument that the petitioner in Sherbert should not be 
required to sacrifice her religious belief in order to receive the unemployment com-
pensation benefit. On the basis of this case it has been argued that parents may not 
constitutionally be denied the benefit of public tax funds to educate their children 
because they have elected to exercise their constitutional right to send them to paro-
chial schools. This argument was rejected, and Sherbert distinguished, in DiCenso v. 
Robinson, 316 F. Supp. 112, 123 (D.R.I.) prob. juris. noted, 39 U.S.L.W. 3199 (U.S. 
Nov. 9, 1970) (No. 570). See also Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 HARv. 
L. REv. 1680, 1686-87 (1969). 
On this question it is interesting to observe that the West German Constitution 
(Basie Law of the Federal Republic of Germany), which guarantees the right to 
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tion on the use of public funds to support only public schools is a 
permissible classification. Nor does the state's support of all private 
schools except parochial schools amount to unlawful discrimination 
if the discrimination is required by the Constitution. But this is 
precisely the question at issue. Under the strict-neutrality theory 
such discrimination is forbidden. According to the secular-purpose 
approach such discrimination is not required. Similarly, the accom-
modation doctrine of Walz is relevant in suggesting that, so far as 
the first amendment is concerned, the government may-although it 
is not required to do so-extend the benefit of its spending in aid of 
education to private institutions, including church-related institu-
tions, as an accommodation both to freedom of choice and to the 
pluralistic character of our society. 
In respect to what has been described as the first step in the 
handling of the establishment problem,115 arguments and standards 
developed in the cases to date may be marshalled to support the 
constitutionality of capital grants to church-related colleges for 
secular purposes and of the purchase of secular teaching services at 
parochial schools. This is not to suggest either that these arguments 
will be conclusive or that distinctions may not be made between aid 
to church colleges and aid to parochial schools.116 All that is sug-
gested is that decisions by the Supreme Court give support to the 
results reached by the lower courts in the Tilton and Lemon cases. 
Since Tilton and Lemon were decided prior to the Supreme 
Court's decision in Walz, the three-judge courts in those cases did 
not proceed with the second step in the analysis of an establishment 
clause problem and discuss the entanglements issue. But in view of 
establish private schools (GRUNDGESETz FUR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND art. 7(4), 
§ 1), has been interpreted to create a duty on the part of the state to provide 
financial support for these schools in proportion to the public service they render. 
See Kauper &: Halberstadt, Religion and Education in West Germany: A Survey and an 
American Perspective, 4 VALPARAISO U. L. REY. 1, 24-28 (1969). 
II5. See text following note 99 supra. 
ll6. For a statement of considerations advanced in support of the constitutionality 
of financial aid to church colleges, as distinguished from aid to parochial schools, 
see P. KAUPER, RELIGION AND THE CoNSTlTUTION II4-16 (1964); GENERAL COUNSEL OF 
DEFT. OF HEW, CONSTITUTIONALITY OF FEDERAL Am TO EDUCATION IN VARIOUS AsPECTS, 
S. Doc. No. 29, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 n.18 (1968). Note also the following language 
taken from footnote 15 of the DiCenso opinion: 
While we conclude that Rhode Island's statute is unconstitutional, we do not 
wish to be read as condemning aid in any form to institutions affiliated with reli-
gion. We do not, for example, disagree with the result in Tilton v. Finch, supra, 
which upheld a federal enactment subsidizing secular facilities at private colleges, 
including church-related colleges. The degree of institutional involvement re-
quired by the federal program was episodic and relatively slight. Moreover, de-
nominational colleges do not have the same close financial, legal, and pedagogical 
relationship to the Church as do parochial schools. 
316 F. Supp. at 122 n.15. 
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the prominence of this issue in DiCenso, it may be expected to play 
an important part in the Court's review of Tilton and Lemon. In 
reaching the conclusion that the Rhode Island statute authorizing 
the purchase of secular teaching services in parochial schools would 
result in excessive entanglements between the secular- and parochial-
school authorities, the court in DiCenso said that the annual renewal 
and possible enlargement of these subsidies would excite bitter con-
troversy, and that substantial state subsidies would produce sig-
nificant state limitations on the freedom of denominational schools, 
since such a direct subsidy requires greater administrative involve-
ment between church and state than the payments involved in Ever-
son or Allen. Thus, the Rhode Island Commission of Education 
would have been required to audit parochial-school expenditures 
and in close cases determine which spending is "religious" and 
which is "secular." Moreover, according to the district court, the 
kind of involvement permitted by the statute might significantly 
limit the internal freedom of parochial schools since it would in-
fluence the action of teachers in choosing the courses they would 
teach and the content thereof.117 Also, heavy state subsidy of parochial 
schools, according to the DiCenso court, may be viewed as state ac-
tion subject to the restrictions of the fourteenth amendment.118 
The arguments advanced on the entanglements issue in DiCenso 
are mentioned here not to indicate that they are dispositive of the 
matter but because they suggest some of the considerations relevant 
in dealing with the entanglements problem. Chief Justice Burger 
in Walz said that entanglements are a matter of degree, and that the 
Court's concern is with excessive entanglements. The problem must 
therefore be viewed in the perspective of the total picture presented 
when the state and church-related institutions cooperate in enter-
prises that serve the common good. Education, health, and welfare 
are enterprises shared by the state and private institutions-includ-
ing church-related institutions. Admittedly, the state has a broad 
authority to prescribe standards and conditions that apply to pub-
lic and private institutions alike. Substantial entanglement exists 
whether or not the government subsidizes the private institutions. 
Private schools, including parochial schools, are already subject to 
extensive legislative and administrative control. The public interest 
in adequate education for all its children-an interest reflected in 
the compulsory-educa"tion laws-warrants the imposition of stan-
dards and controls on the private schools that parents may choose 
to elect for the education of their children. The state may appropri-
117. !116 F. Supp. at 120-21. 
118. !116 F. Supp. at 121. 
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ately compel adherence to requirements respecting such matters as 
qualification of teachers, basic courses to be taught, attendance, and 
health and safety requirements. Some entanglements, therefore, in-
here in the situation.119 
The question then is whether the statutory conditions, contrac-
tual requirements, or administrative supervision that accompany a 
particular program for extending public financial assistance to pri-
vate institutions create such further involvement that it becomes ex-
cessive. Distinctions may be made that turn on the way in which the 
institution is benefited. Assistance that goes directly to students or 
parents, such as tuition grants, raises no substantial entanglement 
problem. The same is true of a program of financial assistance that 
is administered by the state authorities for the benefit of students and 
that results in aid to the institutions. In Everson the state reim-
bursed parents for the cost of transporting their children to parochial 
schools, and in Allen the state educational authorities made the final 
choice of which textbooks were to be loaned free of charge to paro-
chial school children. Fewer entanglements are found in these ar-
rangements than in arrangements that call for direct payments to 
parochial-school authorities, and that may require some degree of 
public supervision of the services rendered as the quid pro quo of 
the payment. This distinction between direct and indirect assistance, 
however, may be formal rather than substantive. The courts in the 
Tilton and Lemon cases rejected the argument that financial as-
sistance to church-related educational institutions was invalid simply 
because payments were made directly to the institution. Neverthe-
less, the Court's views on the entanglements question may prove to 
be a major factor in the legislative choice of ways and means of 
assisting private education. 
It would, indeed, be surprising if an affirmative grant of public 
funds to a church-related institution, in order to help support what 
the state recognizes as the secular aspect of the institution's program, 
were viewed as resulting in excessive entanglements simply because 
the institution was church-related and because the acceptance and 
administration of the grants required the receiving institutions to 
119. Private schools may also be subjected to restrictions that are designed to 
prevent or discourage racial discrimination. Recently the Treasury Department has 
announced a policy of disallowing deductions for contributions made by donors to 
private schools which practice racial discrimination. IRS News Release, July 10, 1970, 
7 CCH 1970 STAND. FED. TAX REP. 1J 6790. See N.Y. Times, July 11, 1970, at 1, 
col. 8. See generally Note, The Validity of Tax Benefits to Private Segregated Schools, 
68 MICH. L. REv. 1410, 1412 n.16 (1970). The Supreme Court's decision in Jones v. 
Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), suggests that Congress, in the exercise of its 
power to enforce the thirteenth amendment, could prohibit racial discrimination in all 
schools, whether public or private. 
December 1970] The Walz Decision 209 
comply with certain conditions and controls designed to insure the 
achievement of the intended public purpose. Such a view would 
require the invalidation of substantial portions of many federal and 
state programs that extend assistance to a wide variety of nonpublic 
agencies, including church-related agencies, which operate hospital 
and social-welfare programs of various kinds. The vital question is 
not whether the state is dealing with and asserting some control over 
church-related institutions, but the extent to which it is thereby 
entangling itself in religious affairs.120 
Distinctions may also be made that depend on the nature of the 
assistance rendered to the private institution. Differences may be 
observed between nonrecurring capital grants to church-related col-
leges, as in Tilton, and annually renewable payments to reimburse 
parochial schools for operating costs incurred in teaching secular 
subjects.121 The former practice may result in only a modest entan-
glement in terms of the conditions prescribed for the grant, whereas 
the latter-whether characterized as a subsidy or as a purchase of 
services-may invite the administrative controls and checks that con-
stitute the kind of "official and continuing surveillance" to which 
the Chief Justice referred in W alz.122 Also, the prospect of annual 
renewal would open up the possibility for controversies that pro-
mote sectarian divisiveness. 
Just as entanglements are a matter of degree, so also the question 
of what may be a permissible degree of entanglement cannot be di-
vorced from the substance of the whole problem before the Court. 
The existence of entanglements is one factor to be weighed and 
balanced along with other considerations. How strong or even domi-
nant is the secular purpose served by the public assistance? How 
readily should the Court find a forbidden entanglement when church-
related institutions are involved, thereby forcing government to 
discriminate on religious grounds? And may the Court tolerate 
greater entanglements in state-administered programs than in federal 
programs, as suggested by Justice Harlan?123 
The striking of a balance ultimately reaches into the considera-
tions underlying the "entanglements" and "involvement" formu-
120. See the early case of Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899), in which 
the Court, in upholding a congressional appropriation to a District of Columbia 
hospital that was under a contract with the Commissioners of the District to provide 
care for indigent patients, said it was immaterial that the affairs of the corporation that 
owned the hospital were managed by a sisterhood of the Roman Catholic Church. 
121. This distinction was made by the federal court in DiCenso in the footnote 
passage in which the court said it did not disagree with the Tilton holding. See note 
II6 supra. 
122. See text accompanying note 54 supra. 
123, See note 76 supra and accompanying text. 
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lations. Government should keep its hands out of the affairs of the 
churches in order to avoid encroachments and embroilments that 
impinge on the constitutional autonomy of the churches and that 
invite the risk of the politicization of the churches and of sectarian 
fragmentation of the public order. It is vital to the freedom of the 
churches that they rely only on voluntaristic support of their spir-
itual functions. But the institutions-such as schools and hospitals 
-that churches operate in areas of public concern are an important 
part of the total private sector that distinguishes American plu-
ralism. The maintenance of these institutions and the freedom of 
choice they represent is also a matter of public concem.124 The de-
gree of this concern will help measure the tolerance of the entangle-
ments resulting from public assistance to these institutions. 
The issue of entanglements brings up crucial questions that go 
to the heart of church-state relations. These questions point up the 
great dilemmas in this area of American public law. Must the state, 
in order to avert encroachments upon the freedom of the churches 
and to avoid the risk of sectarian fragmentation of the public order, 
deny public assistance essential to the continued functioning of 
church-related institutions which admittedly serve a public purpose 
and which constitute a significant element of our pluralistic society? 
Or, in tum, if the state may grant assistance to these institutions, 
can they accept this assistance and the controls reasonably appropri-
ate thereto without sacrificing their essential identity?125 
The concrete problem decided in Walz was a relatively simple 
one. The cases now coming before the Court raise critical and ulti-
mate issues respecting the structure of our political and social order. 
The Constitution yields no compelling answers. To the Court falls 
the unenviable task of resolving these issues by making choices be-
tween competing interests and values of a higher order. Resort to 
constitutional litigation as a means of dealing with these questions 
imposes an extraordinary strain on the judicial process. The occa-
sion calls for the wisdom of a Solomon. 
124. Justice Brennan in Walz stated that "[g]overnment may properly include reli-
gious institutions among the variety of private, nonprofit groups that receive tax 
exemptions, for each group contributes to ·the diversity of associations, viewpoint, and 
enterprise essential to a vigorous, pluralistic society." 397 U.S. 664, 689 (1970) Gustice 
Brennan, concurring). 
125. See, in this connection, the interesting and suggestive footnote by Justice 
Harlan in his concurring opinion in Walz, 397 U.S. 699 n.2, quoted in note 75 supra. 
